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Supreme Court of Arkansas
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No. 90-223
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305 Ark. 566, 810
S.W.2d 910, 1991.AR.0042729< http://www.versuslaw.com>
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June 3, 1991
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CRAIN INDUSTRIES, INC.
V.
KENNETH CASS, LOIS MARION, MARY
SHERMAN, VICTOR KNAULS, WILLIAMS KEITH, AND DAVID
HAYWOOD
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SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
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1. MASTER & SERVANT - EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL DOCTRINE. - An employer
or an employee may terminate an employment relationship at will except
where there is an agreement that the employment is for a specified time,
in which case firing may be only for cause, or where an employer's
employment manual contains an express provision stating that the employee
will only be dismissed for cause and that provision is relied on by the
employee.
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2. MASTER & SERVANT - EMPLOYMENT AT WILL - HANDBOOK PROVISIONS
BECOMING PART OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT. - If the handbook language |
[305 Ark Page 567] is
sufficiently definite to constitute an offer, the offer has been
communicated by dissemination of the handbook to the employees, and the
employee has accepted the offer by continuing to work for his employer
although he is free to leave, a personnel handbook, distributed after
employment begins, may become part of an employment
contract.
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3. MASTER & SERVANT - EMPLOYMENT AT WILL - HANDBOOK PROVISIONS
BECOMING PART OF EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT. - When an employer makes definite
statements about what its conduct will be, an employee has a contractual
right to expect the employer to perform as promised.
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4. MASTER & SERVANT - EMPLOYMENT AT WILL - SPECIFIC PROVISION IN
EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK GOVERNING PROCEDURE FOR LAYOFFS - NO ERROR TO PRESENT
ISSUE TO JURY. - It was not error to present the breach of contract issue
to the jury, where actual layoffs were contrary to the employment
handbook's provision that layoffs would be on a last-hired-first-laid-off
basis.
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5. MASTER & SERVANT - EMPLOYMENT AT WILL - ALTERATION OF TERMS IN
HANDBOOK - CHANGE MUST BE EFFECTIVELY COMMUNICATED TO THE EMPLOYEE. - Even
if an employer may subsequently change the terms provided in a personnel
handbook, the change must be effectively communicated to the
employees.
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6. WITNESSES - LEGAL OPINIONS OF WITNESSES - WITNESSES NOT PERMITTED
TO GIVE OPINION WHETHER THE HANDBOOK CONSTITUTED A CONTRACT - ERROR NOT
PREJUDICIAL, EVIDENCE BEFORE COURT. - Even if it was error for the trial
court to grant a motion in limine prohibiting witnesses from giving their
opinions whether the handbook constituted a contract, the error was not
prejudicial because appellant's vice president, who was also the corporate
secretary, a member of the board of directors and a lawyer, testified that
it had always been appellant's position that the handbook represented the
policies of the company, not a contractual commitment.
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7. CONTRACTS - JURY INSTRUCTIONS - NO ERROR TO USE TERM "MEETING OF
THE MINDS." - The trial court correctly instructed the jury to find "a
manifestation of mutual assent to the terms and conditions of the
contract, and no real harm was done in this case by the trial judge's
additional reference to a "meeting of the minds," because the jury was
given an instruction from which it could conclude that it was to determine
whether there was evidence that the acts of the parties constituted
"indicators of agreement," when it required a "manifestation of mutual
assent."
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8. DAMAGES - DUTY TO MITIGATE - SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE DUTY FULFILLED. -
Where a maintenance supervisor refused reemployment |
[305 Ark Page 568] at an
hourly wage preferring his old job, searched for other jobs, and attempted
to speak to appellant's officials by phone, but his calls were not
returned; and where the other two employees abandoned their unsuccessful
job searches after receiving Social Security benefits, the question of
whether the three employees had exercised sufficient diligence in their
job searches was one of fact for the jury, and the verdict that they had
fulfilled their duty to mitigate was not clearly against the preponderance
of the evidence so as to require a new trial.
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9. ATTORNEY & CLIENT - FEES - BREACH OF CONTRACT. - It was not
improper to award an attorney's fee pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 16-22-308
(Supp. 1989) in a breach-of-contract case.
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Appeal from Sebastian Circuit Court; Don Langston, Judge;
affirmed.
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Gilker and Jones, by: Michael R. Jones, for appellant.
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Martin, Vater, Karr & Hutchinson, by: W. Asa Hutchinson, for
appellee.
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The opinion of the court was delivered by: David Newbern, Associate
Justice.
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This is a wrongful discharge from employment case. The appellant,
Crain Industries, Inc., employed the appellees, Kenneth Cass, Lois Marion,
Mary Sherman, Victor Knauls, William Keith, and David Haywood. Due to a
reduction in the work force at Crain Industries, those employees were laid
off, although they were senior in length of service to some others in
their respective departments who were not laid off. The employees claimed
breach of contract on the basis of a provision in the Crain Industries
employment handbook which provided:
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In the event it should become necessary to reduce the number of
employees in the work force, employees will be laid off on a seniority
basis by department. The last employee hired would be the first to be laid
off. This policy will be adhered to with one possible exception; that is,
under circumstances where the efficiency of a department would be impaired
by the loss of some particular employee's skill.
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It is not argued that any of these employees were laid off because of
the need to retain a "particular employee's skill." Crain Industries' main
argument is that the employees were "at will" employees, and the language
of the handbook quoted above |
[305 Ark Page 569]
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was "precatory" and insufficient to form the basis of a holding that
Crain Industries had contracted not to lay off the employees except in
accordance with the handbook. We affirm the judgment based on a jury's
finding that Crain contracted to conduct the lay-off in accordance with
the provisions of the handbook. Crain raises additional points in which we
find no merit, and we will state additional facts as needed to dispose of
them.
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1. Handbook as contract
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As to how the handbook came into existence, Kenneth Cass testified as
follows:
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A. Well, they were trying to form a union, out there at Crain, because
of them recently firing a supervisor, and Mr. Crain called a meeting. I
think it was the day or the day before we were to take a vote. And he said
that we didn't need a union, that if we would vote no to the union, he
would come out with a policy that would - guidelines for the employees and
the supervisors and Crain Industry, you know.
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Q. And was the union voted in or voted out?
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A. They were voted out.
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Q. And subsequent to that, was the policy manual
adopted?
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A. Yes.
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Cass went on to testify that he was aware of the seniority provisions
in the handbook and that the seniority concept was important to him as he
remained with the company. Marion, Sherman, Knauls, Keith, and Haywood,
also testified of their awareness of the provisions and their expectations
that Crain Industries would follow them. The testimony was submitted to
the jury which was instructed to find in favor of the employees if the
jury found express provisions in the handbook constituting an express
agreement. The jury found the express provision and agreement. The Trial
Court entered judgment based on that finding.
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[1] Generally, the law of this State is that an employer or an
employee may terminate an employment relationship at will. In |
[305 Ark Page 570]
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Jackson v. Kinark Corp., 282 Ark. 548, 669 S.W.2d 898 (1984), we
recognized that this common law rule was changing in other states which
were softening it by finding express or implied agreements for a specified
period of employment or by holding that an employer could not discharge an
employee arbitrarily or in bad faith. The Jackson case was presented to
this Court on appeal of a summary judgment in favor of the employer. We
remanded so that facts could be developed with respect to the existence
and meaning of an employee handbook which Jackson claimed to constitute a
contract of employment. We wrote that we would "be in a position to fully
consider that trend only after the facts in [the] case [had] been
definitely determined." See also Gaulden v. Emerson Electric Co., 284 Ark.
149, 680 S.W.2d 92 (1984); Griffen v. Erickson, 277 Ark. 433, 642 S.W.2d
308 (1982).
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In Gladden v. Arkansas Children's Hospital, 292 Ark. 130, 728 S.W.2d
501 (1987), we dealt with the cases of two employees, each of whom
contended she could not be fired by her employer without cause. Each claim
was based on statements of the employer made in employment regulations or
an employee handbook. We reviewed our cases to date and stated the extent
to which we meant to revise the employment at will doctrine. We held the
statements in the handbook and regulations were not sufficiently specific
to be binding, and thus we sustained the judgments in favor of the two
employers. In discussing our willingness to reconsider the employment at
will doctrine, we wrote:
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We do ... believe that a modification of the at will rule is
appropriate in two respects; where an employee relies upon a personnel
manual that contains an express provision against termination except for
cause he may not be arbitrarily discharged in violation of such a
provision. Moreover, we reject as outmoded and untenable the premise
announced in St. Louis Iron Mt. Ry. Co. v. Matthews, 64 Ark. 398, 42 S.W.
902 (1897), that the at will rule applies even where the employment
agreement contains a provision that the employee will not be discharged
except for cause, unless it is for a definite term. With those two
modifications we reaffirm the at will doctrine. [292 Ark. at 136, 728
S.W.2d at 505] |
[305 Ark Page 571]
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We thus reaffirmed the employment at will doctrine except where there
is an agreement that the employment is for a specified time, in which case
firing may be only for cause, or where an employer's employment manual
contains an express provision stating that the employee will only be
dismissed for cause and that provision is relied on by the
employee.
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In Smith v. American Greetings Corp., 304 Ark. 596, 804 S.W.2d 684
(1991), we were asked, and we declined, to hold this language in an
employer's handbook created an enforceable promise to discharge only for
cause: "We believe in working and thinking and planning to provide a
stable and growing business, to give such service to our customers that we
may provide maximum job security for our employees." We held that it did
not rise to the level of an "express provision" as the Gladden case ruling
required.
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In the case now before us, there is no contention that the employees
were hired for a specified time. The question is thus whether the
exception to the employment at will doctrine for a contract arising from a
promise made in the handbook, applied. Crain Industries argues that there
was no express provision. By comparison with the one we reviewed in the
Smith case, the provision here is a model of clarity and definiteness.
There is no doubt as to its meaning, but the question remains whether it
is to be enforced.
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Although the handbook in this case did not contain the provision on
firing only for cause, the employees contend with respect to the Gladden
case, "it is clear that the court envisioned a modification of the at-will
doctrine in any case in which there was an express provision in the
employee handbook governing the procedure at the time of
termination."
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The trial court did not err in presenting the matter to the jury. In
the Gladden appeal, where we held for the employers because we could find
no specific provision in the employment regulations or manual requiring
dismissal to be for cause only, one of the appellants cited Wagner v.
Sperry Univac, 458 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Pa. 1978). We distinguished the case
and stated, "In Wagner, a reduction in force was to be governed by
seniority in determining who would be laid-off and Wagner's discharge
violated that provision." While the holding in the Gladden case is hardly
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[305 Ark Page 572]
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a direct adoption of the Wagner decision, we did imply that if there
were such a provision in an employment manual it would be enforceable, and
that is entirely consistent with our explanation that an exception to the
employment at will doctrine may arise from reliance on a promise made in
an employment handbook.
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The Trial Court was correct in assuming, after studying the Gladden
decision, that this Court would not hold that clear language constituting
a promise not to dismiss other than for cause would be upheld but clear
language constituting a promise not to dismiss in a lay-off except by
departmental seniority would not be upheld.
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Cases dealing specifically with handbook provisions are collected in
Comment, Unilateral Modification of Employment Handbooks: Further
Encroachments on the Employment-at-Will Doctrine, 139 Penn. L. Rev. 197
(1990). The author points out that unilateral contract analysis is common
in handbook cases and quotes the following, omitting citations, from Small
v. Springs Indus., Inc., 292 S.C. 481, 357 S.E.2d 452, 454
(1987).
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[There are] "strong equitable and social policy reasons militating
against allowing employers to promulgate for their employees potentially
misleading personnel manuals while reserving the right to deviate from
them at their own caprice." ... It is patently unjust to allow an employer
to couch a handbook, bulletin, or other similar material in mandatory
terms and then allow him to ignore these very policies as "a gratuitous,
non-binding statement of general policy" whenever it works to his
disadvantage. Assuredly, the employer would view these policies
differently if it were the employee who failed to follow them .... If
company policies are not worth the paper on which they are printed, then
it would be better not to mislead employees by distributing
them.
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In Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983), the
Minnesota Supreme Court was apparently confronted with arguments to the
effect that provisions in an employment handbook relating to disciplinary
action against an employee were unenforceable. A bank employee was fired
summarily, allegedly for cause, and the bank president did not follow the
discharge or |
[305 Ark Page 573]
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disciplinary procedures in the handbook. The employee brought an
action based on contract and prevailed. The first two issues, as stated by
the Court, were as follows: "(1) Can a personnel handbook, distributed
after employment begins, become part of an employee's contract? (2) If so,
are job security provisions in the handbook enforceable when the contract
is of indefinite duration.?"
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[2] Answering the first question in the affirmative, the Court
wrote:
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If the handbook language [is sufficiently definite to constitute] an
offer, and the offer has been communicated by dissemination of the
handbook to the employee, the next question is whether there has been an
acceptance of the offer and consideration furnished for its
enforceability. In the case of unilateral contracts for employment, where
an at-will employee retains employment with knowledge of new or changed
conditions, the new or changed conditions may become a contractual
obligation. In this manner, an original employment contract may be
modified or replaced by a subsequent unilateral contract. The employee's
retention of employment constitutes acceptance of the offer of a
unilateral contract; by continuing to stay on the job, although free to
leave, the employee supplies the necessary consideration for the offer.
[Footnotes omitted.]
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In answer to the second question, also in the affirmative, the Court
wrote:
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The argument is that a provision for job security in a contract of
indefinite duration, whether initially promised or subsequently added, is
not binding without additional, independent considerations other than
services to be performed.
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Handbook provisions relating to such matters as bonuses, severance pay
and commission rates are enforced without the need for additional, new
consideration beyond the services to be performed. See DeGuiseppe, The
Effect of the Employment-at-will Rule on Employee Rights to |
[305 Ark Page 574]
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Job Security and Fringe Benefits, 10 Fordham Urban L.J. 1 (1981). We
see no reason why the same may not be true for job security provisions.
Accord Note, Protecting At Will Employees, ... 93 Harv. L. Rev. at 1819-20
(employee's continued labor despite freedom to resign is ample
consideration for all express or implied promises, including those
relating to job security). Thus, the consideration here for the job
security provision is Mettille's continued performance despite his freedom
to leave. See, e.g., Carter v. Kaskaskia Community Action Agency, 24 Ill.
App.3d 1056, 1059, 322 N.E.2d 574, 576 (1974). As such, the job security
provisions are enforceable.
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The Minnesota Supreme Court's opinion on these issues concludes as
follows:
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Not every utterance of an employer is binding. It remains true that
"the employer's prerogative to make independent, good faith judgments
about employees is important in our free enterprise system." Blades,
Employment at Will v. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise
of Employer Power, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 1404, 1428 (1967). Properly applied,
we think that the unilateral contract modification analysis appropriately
accommodates the interests of the employee and the employer.
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| [55] |
The reference to "not every utterance" is apparently to an earlier
discussion in the Court's opinion about the sort of vague assurances of
"permanency" in employment to which an employer cannot be held, and the
sort of vague references we encountered in Smith v. American Greetings
Corp., supra.
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[3, 4] The essence of the Minnesota Supreme Court's opinion is like
that found in the Pennsylvania Law Review article referred to and quoted
above; when an employer makes definite statements about what its conduct
will be, an employee has a contractual right to expect the employer to
perform as promised. Given our statement in the Gladden case that we would
regard a specific handbook promise not to discharge except for cause, and
given the contract rationale spelled out by these authorities for handbook
promises generally, we conclude it was not error to instruct the jury as
was done in this case. |
[305 Ark Page 575]
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2. Disclaimer
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During the time the employees worked for Crain, the handbook or manual
was changed to include this statement:
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The above policies have been explained to me and I have been given a
copy of the Company Handbook. I understand that the Company Handbook is
not a contract of employment and we reserve the right to change it at any
time.
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| [60] |
The statement appears on a page of the handbook containing a checklist
of information to be given a new employee with a place for his or her
signature at the bottom and a notation that the form should be placed in
the employee's personnel file. Crain argues that it was free to change the
handbook by adding the disclaimer. The employees testified they were not
aware of the change. Crain did not produce evidence that any of them had
signed any such checklist.
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[5] Crain cites cases in which it has been held that similar
disclaimers were effective. See, e.g., Eldridge v. Evangelical Lutheran
Good Samaritan Soc., 417 N.W.2d 797 (N.D. 1987); Castiglione v. Johns
Hopkins Hosp., 69 Md. App. 325, 517 A.2d 786 (1986). In each of them it
was evident that the employee in question was aware of the disclaimer.
While we might agree that an employer may change the terms pursuant to
which its employees remain employed by it, we conclude that if such a
change is to be effective it must be communicated to the
employee.
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| [62] |
Generally a contract cannot be modified unilaterally, Leonard v.
Downing, 246 Ark. 397, 438 S.W.2d 327 (1969); Scottish Union and Nat. Ins.
Co. v. Wilson, 183 Ark. 860, 39 S.W.2d 303 (1931). The pros and cons of
permitting an employer to modify a handbook in such a manner as to affect
the contractual rights of employees absent additional consideration given
to the employees are discussed in the Pennsylvania Law Review note
referred to above. We reserve judgment on the question whether, and under
what conditions an employer may effectively modify a handbook with notice
to affected employees. We find no error in allowing the jury to conclude
here that there was no effective modification with respect to these
employees. |
[305 Ark Page 576]
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3. Legal opinions of witnesses
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The trial court granted a motion in limine by the employees stating
witnesses would not be permitted to give their opinion whether the
handbook constituted a contract. Crain Industries contends it was error to
grant the motion because it prohibited Crain's witnesses from testifying
as to Crain's intent in issuing the handbook.
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| [65] |
[6] The short answer to the argument is that, even if granting the
motion had been error, it was not prejudicial because there was such
testimony before the jury. Richard Ries, Vice President of Crain
Industries, Secretary of the Corporation, a Member of the Board of
Directors, and a lawyer, testified, "It has always been our position that
this handbook represented the policies of the company, but that it wasn't
a contractual commitment by the company."
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| [66] |
4. Instructions
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| [67] |
The trial court gave an instruction to the jury regarding the elements
of a contract. It included a statement that there must be a "manifestation
of mutual assent to the terms and conditions of the contract." Crain
Industries sought to have added, "There can be no contract if only one
party intends to be bound." The trial court refused. Crain cites no
authority supporting its contention that the trial court should have added
those words.
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| [68] |
The trial court gave a correct instruction requiring the jury to find
"a manifestation of mutual assent to the terms and conditions of the
contract." The problem here is caused by an added reference by the trial
court to "meeting of the minds." Crain Industries seems to argue that in
order to find a contract, the jury would have to have found a subjective
intent on the part of the corporation to be bound by the terms of the
handbook.
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| [69] |
The battle between those who argued for the "subjective theory" and
those who argued for the "objective theory" of contract has long since
been won by the objectivists. See A. Farnsworth, Contracts, 3.6 (1982). As
Professor Farnsworth points out, "Discussions of this topic would be
improved if this much abused metaphor ['meeting of the minds'] were
abandoned." Id., p. 113, n. 2. Although this Court used the metaphor as
late as last year, we were careful to point out that we meant, in more
|
[305 Ark Page 577]
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modern terminology, "objective indicator[s] of agreement." Fort Smith
Service Fin. Corp. v. Parrish, 302 Ark. 299, 789 S.W.2d 723
(1990).
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| [71] |
[7] No real harm was done in this case, as the jury was given an
instruction from which it could conclude that it was to determine whether
there was evidence that the acts of the parties constituted "indicators of
agreement," when it required "a manifestation of mutual
assent."
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| [72] |
5. Mitigation of damages
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| [73] |
Crain Industries argues that the evidence is insufficient to support
the jury's apparent finding that three of the employees, Cass, Haywood,
and Marion, fulfilled their duty to mitigate damages by seeking other
employment after the lay-off. It is also argued that the jury's decision
in this regard is clearly against the preponderance of the
evidence.
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| [74] |
Each of the employees in question testified about searching for work
after being laid off by Crain. It is argued that Cass, who had been a
maintenance supervisor, was given an offer of reemployment in an hourly
wage position but refused to accept it because he stated he wanted his old
job back rather than the hourly job. Cass testified he searched for other
jobs and he attempted to speak to Crain officials on the phone about their
offer, but his calls were not returned.
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| [75] |
[8] Crain contends that employees Haywood and Marion failed to
mitigate because they abandoned their job searches after beginning to
receive Social Security benefits. Mr. Haywood accepted Social Security
disability benefits after searching unsuccessfully for other employment.
Ms. Marion, who was 62 years old, testified she "retired" after being
consistently refused employment. The question whether she, as well as Cass
and Haywood, exercised sufficient diligence in her job search was one of
fact for the jury which was properly instructed on the issue. The evidence
was sufficient to pose a jury question, and we cannot conclude that the
verdict was clearly against the preponderance of the evidence so as to
require a new trial. See Ark. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(6). |
[305 Ark Page 578]
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| [76] |
6. Attorney's fee
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| [77] |
[9] An attorney's fee was awarded by the trial court to the employees
pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 16-22-308 (Supp. 1989). Crain argues the award
was erroneous because the provision in the statute that the fee be for
"labor or services" applies only to labor or services which have been
performed. The argument misses the point that the statute also provides
that an attorney's fee may be awarded for "breach of contract." Barnett v.
Arkansas Trans. Co. Inc., 303 Ark. 491, 798 S.W.2d 79
(1990).
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| [78] |
As the holding of the trial court was that there was an employment
contract which was breached, the awarding of an attorney's fee was not
improper.
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| [79] |
Affirmed.
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| [80] |
GLAZE and CORBIN, JJ., dissent.
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| [81] |
TOM GLAZE, Associate Justice, dissenting.
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| [82] |
Since 1984, this court has wrestled with the idea of abandoning or
modifying the employment at will doctrine. See Gauldin v. Emerson Electric
Co., 284 Ark. 149, 680 S.W.2d 92 (1984), and Jackson v. Kinark Corp., 282
Ark. 548, 669 S.W.2d 898 (1984). That common law doctrine provides that
when a contract of employment does not bind the employee to serve for a
specified time, the contract may be terminated at will by either party,
even though the contract provides that the employee can be discharged only
for cause. Gauldin, 284 Ark. at 151, 680 S.W.2d at 93. While confronted
with a number of opportunities since Gauldin and Jackson to jettison the
employment at will doctrine, the court has refused to do so. Smith v.
American Greetings Corp., 304 Ark. 596, 804 S.W.2d 683 (1991); Sterling
Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 294 Ark. 239, 743 S.W.2d 380 (1988); Gladden v.
Arkansas Childrens' Hospital, 292 Ark. 130, 728 S.W.2d 501 (1987); Proctor
v. East Central Arkansas EOC, 291 Ark. 265, 724 S.W.2d 163 (1987); Bryant
v. Southern Screw Machine Products Co., 288 Ark. 602, 707 S.W.2d 321
(1986). However, in Gladden the court modified the at will rule in two
respects, viz., (1) where an employee relies upon a personnel manual that
contains an express provision against termination except for cause, he or
she may not be arbitrarily discharged in violation of such a provision and
(2) an |
[305 Ark Page 579]
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| [83] |
employment agreement that contains a provision that the employee will
not be discharged except for cause is cognizable even if it has an
unspecified term. See Gladden, 292 Ark. at 136, 728 S.W.2d at 505. With
these two narrow changes, the court reaffirmed its adherence to the
employment at will doctrine, and later reiterated that reaffirmation in
Smith, 304 Ark. at 600, 804 S.W.2d at 686. In each of the foregoing cases,
this court decided as a matter of law either that the employee failed to
allege a cause of action for wrongful discharge or that the employee
failed in his or her proof on summary judgment to support such an
action.
|
| [84] |
As mentioned in the majority opinion, the employees here based their
wrongful dismissal claim on Crain Industries' breach of the following
provision in its handbook:
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| [85] |
In the event it should be necessary to reduce the number of employees
in the work force, employees will be laid off on a seniority basis by
department. The last employee hired would be the first to be laid off. *fn1
|
| [86] |
The above provision contains no language expressing that the employees
cannot be discharged except for cause. The provision provides only that,
if a reduction in work force is necessary, employees will be laid off on a
seniority basis. Without an express provision against termination except
for good cause, Crain Industries clearly reserved its authority to fire
any employee for any reason.
|
| [87] |
Actually, the earlier Gladden decision presented a much closer case on
its facts to uphold a wrongful discharge action than the situation here.
In Gladden, the employees' manual contained provisions describing methods
for dismissal under certain circumstances and specified different kinds of
conduct that could result in summary dismissal. Even so, because the
manual did not expressly provide that employees would not be discharged
except for cause, this court held as a matter of law that the manual
afforded the employee no basis for a wrongful discharge
action.
|
| [88] |
I would point out that, in all of the manual or handbook employment at
will cases cited above and of which I have |
[305 Ark Page 580]
|
| [89] |
knowledge, this court has never held that a wrongful discharge action
was alleged or a claim was established or that a jury question existed. If
such an action or claim exists here, no doubt such a factual question
existed in Gladden.
|
| [90] |
In conclusion, I would add that I have sympathy for the employees'
beliefs that their employer should have complied with its stated policy
set out in the company's handbook when a work force reduction became
inevitable. Nonetheless, that is not the issue posed here. The majority's
opinion, in my view, simply runs contrary to this court's prior decisions,
and I fear will prove to be the source of considerable confusion in
employment at will cases in the future.
|
| [91] |
I respectfully dissent.
|
| [92] |
CORBIN, J., joins this dissent.
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Opinion Footnotes |
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|
| [93] |
*fn1 One exception to this policy statement was added, but
it is not relevant in this appeal.
|